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The constitutional referendum in Kenya on 4 August 2010 in which the citizens 
overwhelmingly approved the new constitution was a hallmark event in more than one 
aspect. It paved the way for the promulgation of Kenya‟s second constitution. The new 
constitution has reconfigured Kenya‟s institutions across board. It also created a scientific 
revolution in Kenya‟s treaty practice. For the first time, Kenya‟s treaty practice is 
enshrined constitutionally and marks a shift from the old dualist practice to monism. This 
article examines the character and structure of that scientific constitutional revolution. 
 In the face of all the fundamental changes that the new constitution has made in 
Kenya‟s political life, it would be easy to overlook those in Kenya‟s treaty practice, or 
even underestimate their importance. It would also be easy to overlook their significance 
for Kenya‟s domestic legal relations, and its external diplomatic and legal relations. 
 Treaties – bilateral and multilateral – are one of the clearest manifestations of the 
complex interdependence of international relations. States enter into agreements either 
bilaterally or multilaterally, on a wide range of issues touching on their mutual relations. 
So pervasive is the system of agreements and treaties in the system that if the world map 
was marked to show the treaties and agreements existing in the international system, the 
map would disappear, as would the traditional territorial borders reflected on maps. In the 
face of this reality, it is clear that without the system of treaties and agreements pervading 
international relations, the world would be more impoverished. Treaties are an 
increasingly important feature of international and regional relations. They are an 
important aspect of diplomacy, and a notable feature of regional diplomacy. 
 The existing treaty regime covers all the spatial domains of international law and 
relations. This is an important feature of treaties, which prescribe rules in all the domains 
of international relations. These spatial domains range from outer space about which 
there is an important set of treaties beginning with the Outer Space Treaty; the sea and 
the deep seabed which are regulated by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea; 
airspace which is regulated by both multilateral treaties beginning with Chicago 
Convention (1944) to a complex system of bilateral air services agreements; and to the 
environment where there is now a set of treaties regulating different aspects of 
international environmental relations. Apart from the physical ones, treaties occupy other 
spaces too. They regulate other relations between states: from political relations such as 
diplomacy and consular relations; to territorial relations including the definition of  
territories, and statehood; and beyond cooperative relations (i.e. the law of peace in 
international law). Treaties also govern relations during conflict, as humanitarian 
international law as in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their two additional protocols 
of 1977. The international law regime further goes beyond these and concerns itself with 
creations of the human mind, aspects of which are regulated through a distinct treaty 
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regime. Thus inventions and patents, and trade marks the creation of books and poetry 
and music are all under-girded by the system of international law in its treaty domain. 
The system of human rights is another domain which is under-girded and promoted by 
the international treaty regime. It is probably the most important treaty regime given the 
repercussions of not obeying human rights such as holocausts and genocide. But it is also 
the one international treaty regime that governments have tried their best not to be bound 
by. 
 
The Domain of Treaty Practice 
 
 Treaty practices of individual states define how those states will relate not only to 
international law generally, but with those treaties they have accepted to be bound by i.e. 
those treaties that the states have ratified. Treaty practice also establishes the political 
philosophy which governs the relationship between international and domestic law. But 
treaty practice also signifies the legal philosophy (i.e. the jurisprudence) that will govern 
the relationship between international law and municipal law. Treaty practice also 
specifies the relationship among the different branches of government, at least to the 
extent of the country‟s relationship with treaties. In particular it prescribes the role of 
each of the branches of government in the treaty domain, from its negotiation, 
ratification, and its interpretation. Treaty practice is often spelt out in the constitution of 
the country. All states have a treaty practice, although there are states that while having 
some kind of treaty practice have not enshrined it in their constitution. All states have a 
treaty practice because all states must in some way or the other interact with some of the 
thousands of treaties in the international system. The only difference between states in 
this respect is whether their treaty practice is ad hoc,or whether they have structured it in 
the form of a constitutional law. This is why the revolution in Kenya‟s treaty practice as 
enshrined in the new constitution is such an important moment in Kenya‟s diplomatic and 
political life. 
 Treaty practice is concerned with how, domestically, international law and 
municipal law relate to each other (Brownlie, 1990). Treaty practice is one part of the 
more general problem of how international law and municipal law interact with each 
other, and what their relationship should be. The other part of this problem is the status of 
customary international law in municipal law. The relationship between customary 
international law and municipal law has long been settled. It has been acknowledged that 
customary international law is part of municipal law, and is binding on all states. There is  
the outstanding problem that one part of international law is binding on states, while the 
other half is not immediately binding, and needs some specific action of states – in their 
treaty practice – to make treaties which a state has ratified binding municipally. 
International law recognizes three doctrines that deal with the relationship 
between international and municipal law. The first is the monist school, which maintains 
that international law and municipal law are part of one overarching legal system. Since 
they are part of the same legal system, and because there is no competing relationship 
between them, treaties that a state has ratified are automatically part of municipal law, 
and are binding in that domain. Monist thinking maintains that municipal law must be 
consistent with international law; that both municipal law and international law must 
respect the values of the overarching legal system which is founded on natural law; and 
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that as Lauterpacht has argued, international law and municipal law are ultimately 
concerned with the welfare of the individual. The second perspective is dualism, 
advocated by legal positivists. It argues that the two systems of law (international and 
municipal) are different systems of law, each competent in its own domain. From the 
dualist perspective, because of their differences, states apply municipal law with no 
obligation to make it conform to international law. In dualism, international law is 
binding municipally if the state automatically allows it to do so. The third perspective, 
argued by Fitzmaurice maintains that municipal law and international law operate in 
distinct fields; each is supreme in its own field, and there is no common field between 
them (Fitzmaurice, 1957). Unlike dualists who argue that there can be conflict between 
the two systems, coordination theory maintains that the two can never come into conflict; 
and that the only issue is the inability of the state to act domestically as required by 
international law. When the state is unable to meet its international obligations municipal 
law does not thereby become invalid. But the state must do something about meeting its 
international obligations. Thus states choose whether they want to be monists, or dualists, 
or how they wish to coordinate the two systems of law. 
 The monist and dualist schools each have an arm that provides for how states will 
deal with treaties. The monist school contains the methodology of incorporation. In that 
perspective, treaties are automatically incorporated into municipal law, and hence are 
automatically binding. The dualist school is supported by the methodology of 
transformation. In that methodology, treaties do not become automatically binding on 
states unless they have first been transformed into municipal law. The methodology of 
transformation requires that the legislature which makes laws domestically, must first of 
all transform treaties into municipal law. The transformation of treaties into municipal 
law entails clothing them domestically, by making them part of the statutes of the 
country. Thus in Kenya for example, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 
was transformed into the Privileges and Immunities Act (chapter 179 of the laws of 
Kenya), while the 1949 Geneva Conventions were transformed into the Geneva 
Conventions Act (chapter 198 of the laws of Kenya). 
 Given the increasing importance of the treaty regime both internationally and 
regionally, this state of affairs has posed fundamental problems for international law and 
diplomacy. One of the problems is that in Kenya the different perspectives of monism 
and dualism were overridden, with uncritical support being given to the dualist approach. 
At the same time the debates between their methodologies of incorporation and 
transformation were done away with, and uncritical support was lent to the doctrine of 
transformation. The perception has therefore been in vogue in countries like Kenya 
before August 2010, that international law, especially treaties, must first of all be 
transformed before they can be applied domestically. 
  
Framework for Analysis: Emerging Constitutional Gestalt Switches 
 
Kenya‟s new constitution approved by the referendum on 4 August 2010 and 
promulgated on 27 August 2010 entails a gestalt switch in many ways and in various 
aspects of public and political life in Kenya. Depending on one‟s school of thought, the 
provisions on treaty practice in the new constitution clarify the erstwhile treaty practice 
which was characterized by many anomalies and inconsistencies; or the provisions on 
 147 
treaty practice in the new constitution provide a fundamental shift in Kenya‟s treaty 
practice, by creating a new paradigm for treaty practice in Kenya. In the latter 
perspective, the new constitution has midwifed a scientific revolution in Kenya‟s treaty 
practice. This is the perspective of this paper. 
 Thomas Kuhn, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, argued that scientists 
normally operate within the context of „normal science‟, where they are engaged in 
solving the important puzzles of the day. In doing so, scientists work within one 
paradigm, because in the natural sciences paradigms are incommensurable, meaning that 
only one paradigm exists at any one time. In Kuhn‟s view, where there exists only a 
single paradigm, it is not the paradigm that should be blamed when a puzzle is not solved 
but the scientists themselves. In the course of time, the paradigm begins to develop 
anomalies, and when it does so, it increasingly becomes unable to be used as a tool for 
puzzle solving. When the paradigm develops significant anomalies and is unable any 
longer to solve the important problems of the day in the discipline, it is overthrown in a 
scientific revolution. Once it is overthrown in this way, a new paradigm is adopted, and 
scientists continue working within that paradigm, until it too develops significant 
anomalies and in the scientific revolutionary process it too gets overthrown in favour of a 
new one. 
 Kuhn‟s thinking was directed towards the natural sciences. That notwithstanding 
the main elements of his theory have been adopted in social sciences (Banks, 1984). 
There are important differences between the approach to paradigms in the natural 
sciences and that in the social sciences. In the social sciences, paradigms are 
commensurable, because in those disciplines there are many paradigms competing at the 
same time within a discipline. Indeed, the growth of many disciplines such as 
international relations, international law and others, has been achieved because of 
competing paradigms trying to explain better the state of the discipline. 
 Kuhn‟s philosophy of scientific revolutions helps to explain the fate of the 1963 
constitution of Kenya. Hence, in terms of the constitution itself,  it can be argued a la 
Kuhn, that the old constitution of Kenya developed significant anomalies over time; and 
in doing so, it was unable to solve important problems of the day in Kenya. 
Consequently, because of these significant anomalies, the 1963 constitution was 
overthrown in a scientific revolution, and was replaced by the 2010 constitution. Thus the 
new constitution marks a process of scientific constitutional revolution. 
At the same time, in the domain of the constitution and constitutional practices, 
there are paradigms competing for mastery not in Kuhn‟s original meaning, but in the 
way that his thought came to be understood in the social sciences. One such domain is 
treaty law which encapsulates treaty practices as specified in constitutions. In the treaty 
domain, paradigms have been commensurable, with the monist (and incorporation) and 
the dualist (and transformation) theories competing for mastery of Kenya‟s treaty 
practice. In that perspective, the dualist (and transformation) perspective was dominant 
and plied its trade of solving treaty practice puzzles of the day in Kenya for the last forty 
seven years. However, in the course of doing so, it developed significant anomalies, and 
was consequently overthrown by the 2010 constitution, which has prescribed a monist 
(and incorporation) perspective for Kenya‟s treaty practice. Hence the dualist paradigm 
of treaty practice, which had in Kenya developed significant anomalies such as giving life 
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the doctrine of „domestication‟  has now been overthrown in a scientific revolution and 
been replaced by the monist paradigm.  
 
The Dualist Anomalies 
 
The practice of dualism developed certain anomalies, both in its international 
jurisprudential context, but also in its application in Kenya. In the context of the 
jurisprudence of international law, its major failing is that it makes too large a distinction 
between the fate of international customary law and of treaty law domestically. Dualist 
practice means that there is no problem about customary international law being 
incorporated in municipal law; but that there is a problem with the doctrine of 
incorporation for treaties. In its application, dualism thus makes an uncomfortable split in 
international law, and prescribes different methods for their applicability in municipal 
law. This poses problems for international jurisprudence. It maintains unending conflicts 
between customary international law and treaty law. If for example a treaty codifying 
customary international law is created, dualists would have no problem implementing the 
customary international law contained in the treaty in municipal law through 
transformation. On the other hand, when the same customary law is presented as a treaty, 
dualists would have serious problems applying it domestically unless it is first 
transformed into municipal law. This is problematical and poses challenges to the unity 
of international law. It divides international law into two clear domains, each with 
separate systems of  their domestic application. This is the kind of problem that the 
monist perspective cures by maintaining that both systems are part of one legal system, 
and that both are incorporated into municipal law. Hence, the monist doctrine is one of 
the unity of international law, whatever the provenance of its creation. 
 The dualist practice in Kenya since independence illustrates the anomalies that 
this doctrine has imported to the treaty practice of Kenya. Although the 1963 constitution 
did not specify the applicable treaty practice in Kenya, the resulting practice developed 
over time. The lack of constitutional engagement with Kenya‟s treaty practice led it to be 
practiced in an ad hoc way. This ad hoc treaty practice meant that it was not always 
possible to know, on the basis of existing treaty practice which treaties were binding on 
Kenya and those that were not. It also meant that there were treaties that were considered 
binding on Kenya just because they had been ratified, although according to dualist 
practice they were not first transformed. On the other hand, some treaties gained the force 
of law in Kenya because, following dualist practice, they were first transformed into 
Kenyan municipal law. 
 Kenya‟s practice of dualism reflects the tensions that have historically existed 
between the legislature and the executive. The practice reflected the philosophy of 
dualism that treaties must be transformed into municipal law before they could take effect 
in Kenya. But the practice of transformation was championed by the executive rather than 
the legislature in that treaties, or some of them, were first ratified before they were tabled 
in parliament for amendments to other laws to make them conform to the treaties Kenya 
had already ratified by authority of the executive. For example, the Vienna Convention 
on Diplomatic Relations was ratified by Kenya in 1965. It was not however until 1970, 
five years after Kenya ratified it, that the Privileges and Immunities Act was enacted 
giving force to aspects of that treaty in Kenyan municipal law. Another example is the 
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Northern Transit Corridor Agreement which was ratified but necessitated amendments to 
municipal laws of Kenya like the Insurance (Motor Vehicles) Third Party Risks Act (cap. 
405, laws of Kenya). Similarly, the Law of the Sea Convention necessitated amendments 
to municipal laws such as the Fisheries Act. (Mwagiru & Hunja, 1990). 
 Kenya‟s treaty practice until August 2010, to the extent that it is decipherable can 
be summarized as follows. Firstly, parliamentary action is not required for permissive 
treaties, that is, those whose provisions are not inconsistent with any law in force in 
Kenya. On the other hand, treaties that require an act or omission not expressly 
authorized by any laws of Kenya require an act of parliament to give them that effect. 
Thirdly, where a treaty contains provisions which are not catered for by existing laws, a 
statute should be enacted by parliament to give effect to such a treaty.  Clearly from this 
Kenyan perspective, the executive has been able to ratify treaties – i.e. expressing consent 
for Kenya to be bound by a treaty – and parliament‟s role has been to amend any other 
laws so as to make them conform to Kenya‟s treaty commitments. This has in effect been 
a practice that merged elements of dualism and monism, but with no consistency in 
practice. Kenya‟s treaty practice until 2010 was therefore a corrupted dualist one, in 
which parliament was not required to give permission for the executive to ratify treaties; 
but where the executive ratified treaties, monist fashion, the role of parliament was to 
make amendments to other laws of Kenya to make them conform to the treaty. 
 This competition between the two arms of government (executive and legislature) 
has been a hallmark of Kenya‟s treaty practice. In the treaty domain, the executive has 
been the dominant arm, and in this sense the new constitution‟s enactment of the monist 
doctrine has merely ratified this existing state of affairs. It is not surprising that the 
executive should have emerged the stronger. One of the issues that have prompted 
Kenya‟s political and constitutional crises has been a very powerful executive, identified 
as an imperial presidency. The operations of this imperial presidency in the treaty making 
domain in Kenya may have been the rationale for the emergence of the „domestication‟ 
rhetoric in Kenya‟s treaty practice. In this context the rhetoric of „domestication‟ can 
charitably be seen as an attempt to tame the excessive powers of the executive in Kenya‟s 
treaty domain.  
 
The Dynamics of ‘Domestication’ in Kenya’s Treaty Practice 
 
This discourse has been accompanied by one of the most dangerous terminologies in 
trying to explain the relationship between treaties and municipal law. The language has 
come in vogue that treaties must first of all be „domesticated‟ as a way of making them 
comply with municipal law, and thus being applicable in that domain. The language of 
„domestication‟ implies that treaties have first to be subjected to a process of 
„domestication‟ in which they would take on the characteristics of the domestic legal 
system. „Domestication‟ ended up doing away with the methodology and doctrine of 
transformation as understood in international law. Transformation in international law 
prescribed merely a methodology by which a treaty would be clothed in the outward garb 
of municipal law. But it did not entail subjecting treaties to the vicissitudes of municipal 
politics. „Domestication‟ also more or less did away with the doctrine of incorporation, 
since in the epistemology of „domestication‟ a system of incorporation could not exist. 
The language of „domestication‟ posed a further far reaching problem for international 
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law. It meant that for international law to be applicable domestically, it had to first of all 
be treated in the same way as municipal law was treated in the political domain of the 
state. In the political domain of some states, the law is not treated with respect, and hence 
politicians feel that they can change it, and even discard it when it does not serve their 
purposes. Thus the case that was made for the „domestication‟ of treaties was that they 
should be made first to succumb to political processes in the same way that municipal 
law does before they can apply. 
 This approach poses a danger for the integrity of international law. It makes the 
international legal system subject to the manipulations of politicians and interest groups 
in pursuit of their sectoral interests. It makes a mockery of the international negotiating 
frameworks, in which states negotiate rules of international law that must apply to all 
states equally without the attempt to „domesticate‟ them. The practice also flies in the 
face of important emerging universal perspectives in international law, especially in 
international human rights law, that there are some issues about which a state is bound 
whether or not it has signed and ratified a treaty.  
The plea for „domestication‟ in this respect was that the universalism of 
international law had no space in the municipal context, and could be done away with 
through domestic frameworks. This explains the responses that have met the issuing of 
warrants for the international criminal court. The idea is that such warrants should not be 
issued because the Statute of the ICC has not been „domesticated‟, meaning subjecting it 
to domestic political processes which often champion impunity.  The new constitution of 
Kenya, by making Kenya a monist state through section 2(5) that provides that the 
general rules of international law shall form part of the law of Kenya; and especially 
through section 2(6) that provides that any treaty of convention ratified by Kenya shall 
form part of the law of Kenya effectively kills the dangerous doctrine of „domestication‟.  
As argued earlier, the idea of „domestication‟ was an attempt to subdue 
international (treaty) law by making its subservient to municipal laws and practices. But 
it can also be understood in a local political context. The meaning behind „domestication‟ 
was that parliament should play a more prominent, even domineering role in the treaty 
practices of Kenya. It meant, in essence that parliament should take the leading role in the 
ratification process in the country. In that practice, the treaty making process would be 
stood on its head. Firstly, there was no contention that the executive retained the right to 
negotiate treaties on behalf of the country. But once the treaty was negotiated, the 
practice of domestication was to table it in parliament which would then subject it to the 
law making processes in Kenya, and convert the treaty into a statute of Kenya. Once the 
treaty was so converted, and approved, it would be applicable in Kenya, being one of the 
laws of Kenya. The ratification process, if it followed would thus be a mere formality, 
and more or less a diplomatic nicety expressed in formal terms. This dynamic of 
„domestication‟ in effect suggested that a treaty could only be ratified once it had become 
a statute of Kenya. It also meant that once „domesticated‟ there was no real need to ratify 
the treaty since it would already have the force of law in Kenya. 
 This was a dangerous doctrine. It would have led to the practice where the 
substance of international treaty law would be binding in Kenya, for Kenyans, but other 
states could not enforce that law against Kenya since it would have remained a strictly 
municipal law. It would also have meant that should the enforcement of the treaty 
provisions as municipal law became cumbersome, and threaten some political interests in 
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the country, the statute could be removed in the normal operation of domestic politics in 
Kenya. The politics of domestication are therefore evident: they are the politics of 
wanting to have one‟s cake and eat it. This political aspect of domestication would 
subject treaty law to the Kenyan domestic climate. In it, politicians could claim to be 
abiding by the requirements of international treaty consensus to the extent that a treaty 
had been converted into a domestic statute. But whenever the burdens of implementation 
of those rules became too hot to bear, the statute containing those treaty rules could be 
done away with. And the domestic politicians would claim that they were adhering 
strictly to the rule of law. 
 The epistemology of domestication is even more worrying. It entails that 
international law should only exist in domestic form, but can also be ousted by changing 
that domestic form, thus rendering it inapplicable internationally. In this way, it would 
essentially remove the fundamental basis for negotiations in international law of good 
faith, by insisting that good faith does not have to be practiced internationally, and that it 
can be held hostage to the domestic vicissitudes of local politics. This epistemology 
would also pose a fatal challenge to the jurisprudence of international (particularly 
multilateral) negotiations. Multilateral negotiations are founded on the need to give life to 
the complex interdependence of the modern international system. But if international 
negotiations are not eventually founded on good faith, and if their outcome is to be lent 
domestic form without the supporting diplomatic elements specified in documents of 
diplomacy like instruments of ratification, then the country‟s participation in the 
international diplomatic processes of interdependence would be greatly, if not 
permanently injured. 
 The dynamics of domestication do not sit easily with the international law of 
dualism. In the proper practice of dualism, parliament has a certain role to play in the 
process of treaty making and implementation. In this role, parliament discusses a treaty 
that has been negotiated, and votes whether the executive should be allowed to ratify it or 
not. In this process, if parliament votes for the ratification of a treaty, then the executive 
ratifies it, and by so doing that treaty becomes binding on the country. It may, or may not 
be transformed into a domestic statute, depending on the treaty habits of the country in 
question. The argument here is that transformation of the treaty is effected by 
parliamentary discussion of it, and its voting decision to allow its ratification. Hence, 
once the voting decision is made, the treaty is ratified and becomes binding on the 
country from the date of its ratification. The choice to clothe it in the garb of a domestic 
statute is thus not of the essence since the taste of the treaty would be in the voting 
decision of parliament rather than in the clothes it consequently wears. 
 That the whole essence of „domestication‟ is conceptualized in the context of 
domestic politics can be illustrated from recent experiences of Kenya. In Kenya, 
following the electoral violence after the elections of 2007, it was acknowledged that 
individuals who were responsible for that election violence and the deaths that 
accompanied it should no longer enjoy the impunity that they had enjoyed in the past. 
The fight against impunity for crimes against international law has been codified in the 
statute of the international criminal court. Kenya has ratified that statute. It has also 
passed a statute implementing the Rome statute, which requires states parties to “ensure 
that there are procedures available under their national law for all of the forms of 
cooperation…”  However, because of the trend of domestic politics, and the status of 
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those involved in the violence in Kenya, the thinking emerged that parliament should 
enact a local statute creating a tribunal to try those involved in the planning and 
commission of the crimes against humanity. In the debates that followed, there was a 
substantial group of politicians who supported the local tribunal. The thinking was that 
with such „domestication‟ of the trial process, they would be able to escape from the 
rigours of international criminal law, and would even enjoy continued impunity. 
Parliament did not pass the bill on the local tribunal that was being championed. Many 
parliamentarians took the view that „domesticating‟ the trial aspects would encourage 
non-compliance with international criminal law, and that it would do so on the basis of 
domestic political configurations. 
 
The Unending Debate: Monism, Dualism and Human Rights 
 
The debate between monism and dualism has been a characteristic of international law 
for many years. In the general field of international law, it has been argued that this 
debate is not very much of the essence. This view is informed by the belief that in the 
general field of international law the debate may not matter because eventually both of 
them lead to the implementation of international law. This is a good point, although given 
the issues discussed in this paper this conclusion may not be fully valid. For, if dualism in 
some of the ways it is practiced tries to domesticate international treaty law, then clearly  
following the dualist perspective may lead to the non-application of international treaty 
law domestically, or have it implemented in ways that are so diluted that it cannot be said 
to be properly implemented at all. 
 One of the major complaints of dualism is that if the monist approach was 
adopted, it would mean that states can apply laws municipally which were not passed by 
parliament. In other words there is the fear that the role of parliament of making laws 
would be taken over by the executive, at least as far as treaties go. For exponents of 
dualism, this would offend the whole doctrine of the separation of powers, and would 
hence not bode well for the democratic tradition. This criticism can be answered by the 
argument that the adoption of the monist doctrine does not necessarily oust the role of 
parliament in law making. The reason why the role of parliament in law making would 
not thereby be overthrown is that, even in the monist treaty practice, parliament would 
still have the primary role of scrutinizing the treaties before it votes on whether to allow 
the executive to ratify them. Indeed, in this perspective, the role of parliament would 
actually be consolidated. The only thing that would be removed from this role is the 
ability to look at treaties from purely the domestic political perspective of political and 
sectoral interests. Hence, it can be concluded that the much talked about diminishing of 
parliament in the treaty making role is much overstated. 
 The adoption of the monist perspective to treaty making is especially useful in the 
human rights domain. As Judge Tanaka observed in taking a natural law perspective in 
the South West African Cases, human rights are the same and apply equally in 
international law and in municipal law. The growth of human rights treaties over the last 
fifty years or so underlines the importance that human rights and treaties about them have 
taken on. In the development of international human rights law – through many treaties – 
the idea has come to be championed that human rights have increasingly become 
universal This universality of human rights has developed from the older territorial 
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understanding, to the international framework, until currently to the universalist 
perspective. In the universalist perspective of human rights, it is understood that some 
human rights treaties, especially those promoting and protecting fundamental human 
rights are applicable to states whether or not they have ratified them. In this case, for the 
implementation of human rights treaties the doctrine of dualism would not be particularly 
useful, since the question of their ratification would not arise. Hence in the human rights 
domain, the only doctrine that makes sense is the monist one, through which such treaties 
are immediately incorporated into municipal law. 
 The monist approach to human rights treaties is supported by even more serious 
arguments of the jurisprudence of international law. In international law, originally only 
states were subjects of international law. This was later followed after the creation of the 
United Nations by the acceptance, ratified by the international court of justice, that 
international organizations, which are organizations made up of states, are also subjects 
of international law (Bowett, 1982). Until then, individuals were still considered to be 
objects rather than subjects of international law. The growth of human rights, beginning 
with the laws of war, and later extending to other domains of human rights pushed the 
idea that individuals are also to some extent subjects of international law. While there 
have been debates raging about the extent of individuals as subjects of international law, 
there is no little or no debate that they are subjects of international law. Indeed it is also 
agreed that the fact that individuals have certain procedural limitations does not oust their 
status as subjects of international law. 
 This thinking has led to the belief that in fact, individuals are the true addressees 
of international law. While international law addresses states and gives them rights and 
duties, the state is a legal creation, and its duties and rights are implemented and enforced 
by individuals. In addressing states in the general rules of international law and in 
treaties, international law thus effectively addresses individuals. In any case the 
development of international human rights law has increasingly formulated treaties which 
address individuals directly and give them rights and duties as individuals, rather than as 
citizens of states. In this trend of thinking, a case can be made for adopting the monist 
perspective. This perspective directly incorporates treaties, including human rights 
treaties in municipal law. Once this happens, individual citizens can directly plead the 
provisions of human rights treaties even in court, without being disabled by the fact that 
those treaties have not yet been transformed into municipal law. This means in a practical 
sense that in the monist era there will be an added challenge to judges, who now must 
command international rather than merely municipal law. For, if individual citizens can 
go to court on the basis that they have clear rights and duties specified by treaties – and 
maybe not by statute – then clearly judges adjudicating on those rights must do so on the 
basis of international law and be competent in international treaty law, especially its 
approaches to interpretation. 
 
The Diplomacy of Monist Treaty Practice in Kenya 
 
There are thus clear and undisputed grounds for the adoption of the monist approach to 
treaty practice in Kenya. As this article has argued the dualist practice that has been in 
operation in Kenya over the last almost five decades has, in the course of time developed 
significant anomalies. Those anomalies have meant that dualist practice has not been able 
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to solve many important (treaty) problems of the day. In the perspective championed by 
Kuhn, when a paradigm develops significant anomalies in this way, it is overthrown in a 
scientific revolution, after which a new paradigm takes it place and goes along with the 
business of solving important puzzles of the day. The new constitution of Kenya in 2010 
has signified the scientific revolution and overthrow of the dualist paradigm, and 
established the monist paradigm as the new problem solving one in the treaty practices of 
Kenya. 
 The adoption of monist treaty practice will indeed sharpen the separation of 
powers in Kenya. In this approach, the role of each of the three powers in Kenya will 
become even better defined. The executive will negotiate treaties; parliament will debate 
about them, and make voting decisions about whether they should be ratified. And 
following that decision making, and only following it, the executive will ratify the 
treaties as it is required to do by the laws and practices of treaty law and diplomacy. This 
will without doubt enhance significantly the diplomacy of treaty practice in Kenya. Since 
the constitution recognizes a ratified treaty as being part of the laws of Kenya, the old 
framework of transformation, or its various devices such as „domestication‟ will no 
longer be a required treaty practice of the republic. Once the treaties have become law in 
this way, the courts will interpret them as is their judicial function. 
 The role of the courts will not just be limited to interpreting the treaties in a 
national decision making framework. In their role as interpreters of treaties, the courts are 
set to contribute significantly to the development of international jurisprudence, and 
especially international human rights law. This is why, given the monist framework that 
has now been put in the books in Kenya, judges will require to be well trained in 
international law if they are to discharge this constitutional duty properly. 
 In order to implement this new constitutional treaty practice for Kenya, it will be 
necessary to have a separate statute on Kenya‟s treaty practice. Such a statute will help to 
harmonise the treaty practice and all its various elements. It will spell out clearly the role 
of each of the three powers of state – the executive, parliament and the courts, in such a 
way that problems and contentions between them will be duly minimized, if not 
abolished altogether. In reducing the separation of powers conflicts, that statute will have 




This article has surveyed the implications of the new treaty practice of Kenya that was 
established by the 2010 constitution. It has examined the treaty practices that have 
endured in Kenya since independence, and pointed out some of the problems that it has 
spawned. In particular, it has been argued that the dualist perspective that has been in 
force in Kenya has encouraged the politicization of the treaty making process in the 
country. It has been noted that the treaty practice that has been practiced since 
independence has been held hostage by the reality that the other two arms of government 
have been overshadowed by the executive in the treaty making process. This 
overpowering by an imperial executive in turn generated rationales such as the 
domestication of treaties, as the basis on which treaties can be applied in municipal law. 
The doctrine of domestication has certain effects – jurisprudential, philosophical, and 
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political – and it is these that have rendered the erstwhile treaty practice ineffective as a 
means of solving pressing treaty puzzles of the day in Kenya. 
 The thrust of the arguments made in this article is  that dualist treaty practice  
developed significant anomalies over time, and has hence consequently rendered it 
unable – even unwilling – to solve the important treaty and international law problems of 
the day. In consequence, the dualist paradigm has now eventually been overthrown in a 
scientific constitutional revolution. This scientific revolution was long overdue in 
Kenya‟s treaty practice. It however raises the interesting problem of the fate of the 
overthrown treaty practice paradigm in Kenya. While some, like Kuhn have argued that 
an overthrown paradigm should stay that way and remain inoperational, others have 
made the more interesting point that even an overthrown paradigm should not be 
discarded because in the future, it may regenerate and help to solve future problems of 
the day. This is as it should be. In the international relations, international legal and 
diplomatic environment, and in the domestic one, which are all volatile, tools that might 
be engaged in future problem solving should be shelved but not discarded, because after 
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